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ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING: DEVELOPING A
"PREVENTIVE MEDICINE" APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
Courtney M. Price* and Allen J. Danzig**
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving and maintaining compliance with the nation's environ-
mental laws and regulations is a primary goal of federal and state regula-
tory agencies. As environmental regulation has matured, the emphasis
has expanded from initial compliance to continuous compliance. Recent
major environmental incidents have demonstrated the critical need for
companies to reassess their environmental programs' and for regulatory
agencies to develop new compliance approaches. In developing compli-
ance strategies under the environmental statutes, the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found that traditional
administrative and judicial enforcement efforts are not always sufficient
to achieve a high level of compliance from all regulated entities, includ-
ing industry, municipalities and federally-owned facilities. This has be-
come particularly apparent under the environmental programs which
regulate hazardous wastes and toxic substances. To address this issue,
EPA has explored the concept of environmental auditing2 as an innova-
* Partner, Rivkin, Radler, Dunne & Bayh, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1963, University of
Alabama; J.D. 1975, University of Southern California Law Center. Ms. Price was formerly
the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency.
** Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring, United States Environmental Protection Agency; B.A. 1977, University of Penn-
sylvania; J.D. 1980, Rutgers Law School.
The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors. No official sup-
port or endorsement by the United States Environmental Protection Agency is intended or
implied.
1. See Mays, Environmental Audits: A New Enforcement Tool, EPA JOURNAL, June
1985, at 27.
2. Several books have been written to assist corporations in developing environmental
audit programs. See ag., H. BLAKESLEE & T. GRABOWSKI, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PLANT
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS (1985); J. GREENO, G. HEDSTROM & M. DIBERTO, ENVIRON-
MENTAL AUDITING-FUNDAMENTALS AND TECHNIQUES (1985); L. HARRISON, THE MC-
GRAw HILL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING HANDBOOK (1984); T. TRUITT, D. BERZ, D.
WEINBERG, J.B. MOLLOY, G. GOLDMAN, G. PRICE & B. FLORENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL AU-
DIT HANDBOOK-BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITING (2d ed.
1983).
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tive approach to promote increased compliance by the regulated
community.
"Environmental auditing is a systematic, documented, periodic and
objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices
related to meeting environmental requirements."3 Auditing has been
more broadly defined as "an independent appraisal of a corporation's en-
vironmental control systems and its environmental assets and liabilities
to enable management to make rational decisions relating to environmen-
tal matters."' Audits can be used to "verify compliance with environ-
mental requirements; evaluate the effectiveness of environmental
management systems already in place; or assess risks from regulated and
unregulated material and practices."' Auditing may also be viewed as a
quality assurance check by "verifying that management practices are in
place, functioning and adequate."6
Many corporate auditing programs, which began as a check on com-
pliance status, have evolved into a more comprehensive audit of environ-
mental management control systems to assess environmental risks.7 For
example, in reviewing a corporate management system for
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),8 an audit may analyze the system and
procedures for handling, storing, marking, cleaning up spills, inspecting,
record keeping and annual inventorying. The audit could also look for
risks not yet identfiied.
Audits should not be confused with the compliance monitoring ac-
tivities required by environmental laws, regulations or permits. Audit
programs do not replace the inspection programs of regulatory agencies; 9
they evaluate direct compliance activities, such as obtaining permits, in-
stalling controls, monitoring compliance, reporting violations and keep-
ing records. 10
This Article will describe EPA's efforts to encourage environmental
auditing by regulated entities. First, it discusses the evolution of govern-
3. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 50
Fed. Reg. 46,504 (1985).
4. Reed, Environmental Audits and Confidentiality: Can What You Know Hurt You as
Much as What You Don't Know?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,303 (Oct. 1983).
5. Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,504.
6. Id.
7. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., CURRENT PRACTICES IN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING,
REPORT TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 1-2 (1984).
8. Polychlorinated biphenyls are defined as "any chemical substance that is limited to the
biphenyl molecule that has been chlorinated to varying degrees or any combination of sub-
stances which contains such substance." 40 C.F.R. § 761.3 (1985).
9. See Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,504.
10. Id.
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ment and corporate interest in environmental auditing, including the
benefits gained by firms which have instituted auditing programs. The
Article then discusses EPA efforts to promote environmental auditing
through publication of the Agency's Interim Environmental Auditing
Policy Statement 1 and the Agency's negotiation of environmental audit-
ing provisions in enforcement case settlement agreements. Finally, the
Article discusses the major settlement agreements which contain envi-
ronmental auditing provisions, and concludes with some recommenda-
tions on the appropriate use of environmental auditing in achieving
EPA's goal of continuous compliance.
II. EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDITING PROGRAMS
Environmental auditing programs were developed for sound busi-
ness reasons, primarily to assist regulated entities 2 in evaluating compli-
ance and in managing existing and potential pollution control problems,
rather than merely reacting to environmental crises.1 3 Much of the im-
petus for auditing programs has come from a number of recent cases in
which the release of chemicals in the environment has caused and con-
tinue to cause businesses to incur major costs. 4 A highly toxic cloud of
methyl isocyanate released from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, In-
dia, which claimed about 2000 lives and 200,000 injuries and led to dam-
age claims of billions of dollars, is the most dramatic example of a
situation which has caused some companies to reassess their environmen-
tal and safety problems. 5 Auditing programs also evolved, in part, from
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement case settle-
ments, which required environmental auditing.' 6 As a result of these
developments, several hundred major corporations in the country have
voluntarily developed environmental audit programs.' 7 Realizing that
they need to encourage a higher level of corporate attention to environ-
11. Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,504.
12. Regulated entities include private firms and public agencies with facilities subject to
environmental regulation. Public agencies include federal, state or local agencies, and special
purpose organizations such as regional sewage commissions. Id. at 46,504 n.1.
13. Id. at 46,504.
14. Mays, supra note 1, at 27.
15. Id. See also Hall, Environmental Audits-A Corporate Response To Bhopal, ENVTL.
FORUM, Aug. 1985, at 36.
16. See In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,622, 83,356 n.34 (1980); In re United States Steel Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,319 (1979); SEC v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 77-0373
(D.D.C. 1977). See also Reed, supra note 4, at 10,303-04.
17. Address by Francis Phillips, Deputy Regional Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection
June 1986]
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mental compliance, the federal government and state regulatory agencies
have also taken a strong interest in auditing.
The benefits of environmental auditing are tangible and significant.18
First, firms face potential civil and criminal liability under state environ-
mental laws and the environmental statutes administered by EPA, such
as: the Clean Air Act,19 the Clean Water Act,2" the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA),2 the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)22 and
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).23 The new EPA Policy on
Civil Penalties, issued February 16, 1984, directs that penalties must, at a
minimum, reflect the economic benefit or savings of delayed compliance,
Agency, Region VI, at the Government Institutes, Inc. Environmental Auditing Course (Apr.
18, 1985).
18. See generally ARTHUR D. LrrLnE, INC., BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING,
REPORT TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter BENEFITS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING]; J. GREENO, G. HEDSTROM & M. DIBERTO, supra note 2,
at 11-21; L. HARRISON, supra note 2, at 1-9 to 1-21.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). Clean Air Act § 113(b) provides up to $25,000 civil
penalties per day of violation. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b). Section 113(c) provides
criminal penalties of $25,000 and jail terms of up to one year for certain knowing violations.
Id. § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c).
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (minor subsequent amendments have been enacted).
Section 309(b) of the Clean Water Act provides up to $10,000 civil penalties per day of viola-
tion, including a permit limitation or condition. CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982).
Section 309(c) provides criminal penalties of $25,000 and jail terms of up to one year for
certain knowing violations. Id. § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). RCRA provides a comprehensive program for the
cradle-to-grave management of hazardous wastes. This program covers generators, RCRA
§ 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1982), and transporters, id. § 3003, 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (1982), as well
as facilities which treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste. Id. § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924
(1982). RCRA provides for civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day. Id. § 3008(g), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(g). RCRA criminal penalties include
knowingly transporting any hazardous waste to a facility that does not have a permit;
knowingly treating, storing, or disposing of any hazardous waste without a permit or
in violation of any material condition of a permit; knowingly making any false mate-
rial statement in any document filed, maintained, or used to comply with RCRA;
and, for any person who has handled or is handling any hazardous waste, knowingly
destroying, altering, or concealing any record required by regulations to be
maintained.
Id. § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). CERCLA creates a fund for cleaning up abandoned
hazardous waste sites and imposes strict joint and several liability on persons who arrange for
treatment or disposal, or who arranged with a transporter for transportation for treatment or
disposal of hazardous substances at such facilities. CERCLA §§ 106-107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-
9607 (1982).
23. Section 16(a)(1) of TSCA provides for civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day of viola-
tion of the Act. TSCA § 16(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1982). Section 16(b) provides for
criminal penalties of $25,000 per day of violation, or imprisonment for up to one year, for
knowing or willful violations. Id. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
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as well as the seriousness or gravity of the violation.24 Violators also face
potential environmental liability for violations of certain SEC disclosure
requirements,25 and tort liability arising from personal injury, property
damage or toxic tort claims.2 6 Indeed, environmental audits may be re-
quired in order for a firm to obtain pollution liability insurance.27
Audits may be needed especially where a company wants to
purchase, sell, lease or modify facilities. The company must be aware of
any real or potential liabilities associated with the transaction to ensure
that undisclosed liabilities will not come back to affect future opera-
tions.2" The audit will also assist facility managers in understanding and
interpreting regulatory requirements and potential liabilities.29 Thus, an
environmental audit provides corporate management with assurance that
potential problems have been addressed before serious accidents, govern-
ment enforcement or private lawsuits may result.3"
Second, firms can save money by assessing potential environmental
violations and risks as well as by making capital spending decisions to
correct violations, to reduce risks and to maintain proper operation of
treatment systems.31 For example, a firm may realize cost savings
through process changes which reduce the amount of raw materials
needed and which result in less pollution at the end of the manufacturing
process.32 Thus, when a corporation must obtain a new National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, it may choose to
review not just the basis for the permit, but the entire manufacturing
process to determine if cost-effective changes may be needed.33 A com-
24. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Policy on Civil
Penalties.
25. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). SEC regula-
tions require all publicly held companies to disclose the effects of compliance with, and legal
proceedings under, federal and state law through public filings to the SEC. Regulation S-K,
Item 101(c)(1)(xii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (1985); Instruction 5 to Item 103, 17 C.F.R.
§ 299.103 (1985). Significant misstatements or omissions could result in criminal or civil lia-
bility under the federal securities laws. See L. HARRISON, supra note 2, at 2-109 to 2-119.
26. See Garrett, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning Proposed
Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,172 (June 1983).
27. H. BLAKESLEE & T. GRABOWSKI, supra note 2, at 5-6.
28. J. GREENO, G. HEDSTROM & M. DIBERTO, supra note 2, at 13.
29. Id. at 14. See also L. HARRISON, supra note 2, at 29.
30. See J. GREENO, G. HEDSTROM & M. DIBERTO, supra note 2, at 13-14.
31. BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING, supra note 18, at 6-8, 11-14; Friedman,
Managing and Resolving Corporate Environmental Issues, ENVTL. FORUM, Feb. 1985, at 28-
31.
32. Friedman, supra note 31, at 31.
33. Id.
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pany may also effect such savings by implementing similar, changes at
other company plants.
Third, an environmental auditing program can result in an im-
proved relationship between a firm, regulatory agencies and the public,
particularly where audit-discovered violations are identified and cor-
rected within a relatively short period.34 Further, EPA generally bases
its enforcement priorities on industries with significant compliance
problems.35 Also, in developing an appropriate enforcement response to
particular violations, EPA may give some consideration to expeditious,
good faith efforts to achieve compliance.
36
Finally, regulatory agencies such as EPA obtain significant benefits
from environmental auditing programs. These benefits include better as-
surances of compliance from regulated entities, more efficient use of gov-
erment inspection and enforcement resources, improved cooperation
with companies, better compliance information and useful information
about audit systems.37 Thus, environmental auditing can significantly
complement the government's efforts to achieve continuous compliance.
While the benefits of auditing programs are significant, regulated en-
tities have perceived some risks in developing such programs. Audit re-
ports may generate information on violations of a pollution control
statute which may not be otherwise discovered by a regulatory agency
during its normal compliance monitoring activities. Such information
could form the basis for an EPA or state enforcement action.38 An audit
report can also create potential criminal liability where the government
can establish that corporate officials knew of violations.39 Finally, the
environmental statutes authorize private citizens to sue violators through
"citizen suit" provisions.' Of course, a well-run audit program should
expeditiously correct identified violations and other potential liabilities.
34. See H. BLAKESLEE & T. GRABOWSKI, supra note 2, at 5; M. WEISS, ISSUES OF CONFI-
DENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING, REPORT TO U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 2 (1984).
35. See generally OFFICE OF THE ADM'R, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AGENCY
OPERATING GUIDANCE, FY 1986-1987, at 1-2 (discussing the EPA Priority List for Fiscal
Year 1986-1987).
36. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-
SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESSMENTS-IMPLEMENTING EPA's POLICY ON
CIVIL PENALTIES 19-20 (1984) [hereinafter cited as IMPLEMENTING EPA's POLICY ON CIVIL
PENALTIES].
37. BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING, supra note 18, at 1.
38. See Reed, supra note 4, at 10,304.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982). See also Miller, Private Enforcement
of Federal Pollution Control Laws, pt. I, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,309 (Oct.
1983).
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There are also risks from the private sector. The audit report may
contain trade secrets about the company's production process.4 1 Thus,
firms may attempt to limit governmental access to such reports, particu-
larly if they contain information not required to be reported under one of
the environmental statutes.
To address these concerns, well-informed counsel can assist in struc-
turing an audit system to protect particularly sensitive information
through application of the attorney-client privilege and other exceptions
to the discovery rules.4 2 Further, in developing an approach to en-
courage the growth of environmental auditing, EPA has sought to recog-
nize the legitimate concerns of regulated entities while preserving its
enforcement prerogatives.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF EPA ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING POLICY
EPA's interest in environmental auditing evolved from recognition
of mutual gains to be derived by the regulated community and the federal
government. In view of recent environmental calamities and the in-
creased complexity of environmental regulation, EPA has sought to en-
courage a higher level of corporate consciousness regarding compliance
with environmental laws. 3 However, the Agency does not have suffi-
cient resources to enforce these laws against all regulated entities who are
in violation, and must consider innovative approaches to make compli-
ance and enforcement programs more efficient. EPA has attempted to
preserve its enforcement options while providing sufficient flexibility to
give regulated entities an incentive to conduct audits.' Thus, the
Agency has addressed concerns about Agency access to and use of audit
reports in enforcement actions, as well as the concern for flexibility in
corporate design and management of auditing programs.
In developing a policy on environmental auditing, EPA originally
considered mandatory auditing programs requiring firms to hire external
auditors to certify compliance with permits and other requirements.
However, the Agency rejected this concept.4" Regulated entities have
strongly objected to using audits as an additional regulatory program or
requirement.46 EPA subsequently considered less structured methods to
41. Reed, supra note 4, at 10,304.
42. See id. at 10,308.
43. See Mays, supra note 1, at 27.
44. Id.
45. For a discussion of the evolution of EPA policymaking in environmental auditing, see
L. HARRISON, supra note 2, at 5-3 to 5-21.
46. See OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
June 1986] 1195
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encourage achievement of auditing goals, and encouraged auditing
through participation in numerous auditing conferences, workshops and
seminars sponsored by EPA, states, localities, trade associations and pro-
fessional organizations.4 7 EPA's policy work in this area culminated in
November, 1985, with the publication of the Interim Environmental Au-
diting Policy Statement.4"
4. The Environmental Auditing Policy Statement
1. Encouraging environmental auditing
The Environmental Auditing Policy Statement initially provides that:
"It is EPA policy to encourage the use of environmental auditing by reg-
ulated entities [including federal facilities] to help achieve and maintain
compliance with environmental laws and regulations, as well as to help
identify and correct unregulated environmental hazards."49 While state
and local regulatory agencies have independent jurisdiction over regu-
lated entities, EPA encourages states to adopt the Environmental Audit-
ing Policy Statement and approach auditing in a consistent manner.50
EPA also encourages regulated entities to adopt sound environmental
management practices that improve environmental performance, includ-
ing programs that ensure the adequacy of internal systems to achieve,
maintain and monitor compliance.
51
The policy further states that EPA will not dictate or interfere with
the environmental practices of private or public organizations,52 and will
not prescribe minimum requirements for audit programs. Nonetheless,
to provide some guidance to regulated entities which want to develop
environmental audits, the policy outlines the common elements of effec-
tive audits:
(1) explicit management support for environmental auditing
and commitment to follow-up on audit findings;
(2) an environmental audit function independent of audited
activities;
(3) adequate team staffing and auditor training;
AGENCY, PUBLIC COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE EPA INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT-
ING POLICY STATEMENT (1986) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC COMMENTS].
47. Speech by James Edward, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA's Environmental Au-
diting Outlook: Compliance and Enforcement's View, at the Edison Electric Institute (Sept.
27, 1984).
48. Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,505-08.
49. Id. at 46,504.
50. Id. at 46,506.
51. Id. at 46,505.
52. Id.
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(4) explicit audit program objectives, including scope, re-
sources and frequency;
(5) a process which collects, analyzes, and interprets docu-
ments and information on compliance and management effec-
tiveness sufficient to achieve audit objectives;
(6) specific procedures to promptly prepare candid, clear and
appropriate written reports on audit findings, corrective actions
and schedules for implementation; and
(7) quality assurance procedures to assure that the environ-
mental audits are accurate and thorough.53
The policy emphasizes that ultimate responsibility for the environmental
performance of the facility lies with top management, and that independ-
ent internal or third party auditors should conduct the audit.54 Corpo-
rate officials have agreed that top management support and responsibility
for environmental decisions are critical to successful auditing
programs.55
2. Agency requests for audit reports
Second, the policy addresses the extent to which EPA may make
requests to obtain audit reports. The extent of Agency access to and use
of audit information in enforcement has created the greatest concern
among regulated entities.5 6 In addressing this issue, EPA has attempted
to balance the use of its broad authority to obtain coipliance-related
information with these concerns.
EPA can obtain audit generated information in several ways. The
major environmental statutes authorize EPA to require extensive moni-
toring, recordkeeping and reporting schemes relating to compliance with
these laws. 57 Pursuant to this authority, EPA has promulgated regula-
53. Id. at 46,507.
54. Id. at 46,505.
55. See, e.g., Freedman, Organizing and Managing Effective Corporate Environmental Pro-
tection Programs, ENVTL. FORUM, May 1984, at 40-41. In describing the Occidental Petro-
leum Corporation's environmental management program, Mr. Freedman states: "Top
corporate management now is strongly committed to and involved in the company's environ-
mental management programs, as perhaps best demonstrated by the Board of Directors' [sic]
having taken the relatively unusual step of having established an Environment Committee
composed of board members." Id. at 41.
56. See generally PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 46.
57. See, e.g., CWA § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982); CAA § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1982).
In United States v. Tivian Laboratories, Inc., 589 F.2d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 942 (1979), the court upheld EPA's broad authority to make information requests under
these statutes.
June 1986] 1197
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tions on monitoring, recordkeeping and governmental access.58 Thus, in-
formation which is generated by an audit containing required reporting
data, such as a Clean Water Act discharge monitoring report, must be
reported to EPA or a state agency although it does not have to be re-
ported as part of the audit.59 In addition, EPA has authority to request
production of audit files and reports where reasonably related to author-
ized investigations under several statutory provisions, even if the infor-
mation is not required to be reported.60 The Agency can obtain access to
information that is relevant to an authorized enforcement investigation,
including information used to prepare audits and the audit reports them-
selves.61 Finally, audit reports could be obtained by governmental or pri-
vate parties through discovery in civil litigation.62
Recognizing that routine Agency requests may have some inhibiting
effect on auditing programs, the policy statement provides that "EPA
will not routinely request environmental audit reports." 63 At the same
time, EPA maintains its authority to request and receive information in
audit reports under the various environmental statutes."4 EPA may re-
quire such reports where consent decrees contain audit provisions with
reporting requirements, where a company's management practices are
raised as a defense, or where state of mind is a relevant element of in-
quiry.65 Importantly, the policy recognizes that regulated entities have
continuing obligations to monitor, record or report information required
under environmental statutes, regulations or permits, and that EPA has
access to that information.66
Industry commentators on the Environmental Auditing Policy State-
ment felt that EPA did not go far enough to limit its policy on access to
audit reports. They also felt that access should be limited to bad faith
efforts to conceal evidence of violations or criminal investigations.67
58. See, eg., Clean Water Act-National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 122 (1985).
59. See ENVTL. L. INST., ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT ISSUE PAPER: DUTIES TO REPORT
OR DISCLOSE INFORMATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES,
REPORT TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 4 (1985).
60. Id.
61. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 20,635 (N.D. Ill.
1982), affd, 716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983); Public Serv. Co. v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.
Ind. 1981), affid, 682 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
62. See Reed, supra note 4, at 10,305.
63. Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,505 (emphasis
in original).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 46, comments of GPU Service Corp.
1198
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EPA rejected this line-drawing since many Agency legal officials felt that
such a limited set of circumstances could appear to offer a defense to
those unwilling to provide required or requested information, and thus
limit circumstances where EPA would request audit reports.
Nonetheless, with counsel's assistance to set up an audit system, reg-
ulated entities can take certain steps to protect audit generated informa-
tion. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would generally favor
disclosure of audit information,68 a company may attempt to demon-
strate that one of the exceptions to the discovery rules applies.6 9 These
include the attorney-client privilege,7° the work product doctrine7 I and
the privilege for self-evaluative documents.72 However, it may not be
practical to bring the entire audit process within one of these exceptions
given the regulated entity's interest in developing corporate-wide support
and technical expertise for an audit program.
3. EPA enforcement response to environmental auditing
Next, the Environmental Auditing Policy Statement addresses the
impact of environmental audit programs on EPA enforcement response.
The Agency examined the extent to which it could reduce the potential
disincentives for auditing consistent with maintenance of a strong en-
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) states:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party .... It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
69. For a discussion on protecting the confidentiality of environmental audits, see L. HAR-
RISON, supra note 2, at 4-3 to 4-15; Reed, supra note 4, at 10,305-07.
70. To demonstrate the attorney-client privilege, the following elements must be present:
(1) the communication at issue must have been made as part of legal advice given by an attor-
ney; (2) the communication must be between attorney and client; and (3) the communication
must be treated in a confidential manner. The privilege can be waived through voluntary
disclosure by the holder of the privilege. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (E. Cleary 3d
ed. 1984).
71. The work product doctrine applies to documents, notes and other tangible things pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation. The protection is generally lifted if the party seeking discov-
ery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3). An attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories may be
protected whether or not a showing is made. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
72. The self-evaluation privilege may be established by showing: (1) an internal review
process serves an important public interest; (2) disclosure would cut off candid reviews; and
(3) preparation of the reviews is for internal use only. See Reed, supra note 4, at 10,306.
However, courts have been unwilling to apply the privilege to prevent disclosure to a govern-
ment agency. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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forcement program. 73 In other words, where a violator institutes an en-
vironmental auditing program, should the government reduce its
compliance monitoring or reduce enforcement responses to violations
that are either alleged in an enforcement action or discovered by an
audit?
As with EPA access to audit reports, the appropriate EPA enforce-
ment response to environmental auditing does not present the Agency
with significant legal constraints. The environmental statutes and case
law generally allow EPA flexibility in developing enforcement responses
to environmental violations. Several courts have held that the duty to
find a violation is not mandatory.7' Where EPA makes a finding that a
violation exists, EPA generally must take some type of formal enforce-
ment action (i.e., either administrative or judicial) under the Clean Water
Act,75 under the Clean Air Act7 6 or under RCRA.7 7 All statutes author-
ize EPA to choose the type of formal enforcement response. 71 In addi-
tion, while the environmental statutes provide EPA with authority to
obtain substantial penalties, 79 the law does not mandate that EPA obtain
a certain level of penalty or other relief in an enforcement case.8 0
The Environmental Auditing Policy Statement provides that "EPA
will not promise to forgo inspections, reduce enforcement responses, or
offer other such incentives in exchange for implementation of environ-
mental auditing or other sound environmental practice."8" While audits
may complement inspections, they do not provide a substitute for regula-
tory oversight.82 However, the Agency recognizes that, in setting inspec-
73. See ENVTL. L. INST., ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT ISSUE PAPER: ENFORCEMENT RE-
SPONSE, REPORT TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 4 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE].
74. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977); Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 533 F.
Supp. 252 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Contra South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp.
118 (D.S.C. 1978).
75. See South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 131 (D.S.C. 1978);
People ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Ill. 1977). But see Sierra Club v.
Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. See Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 683 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.
1982); Luckie v. Gorsuch, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,400 (D. Ariz. 1983);
Conoco, Inc. v. Gardebring, 503 F. Supp. 49, 51 (N.D. I11. 1980). Contra Kentucky ex rel.
Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172, 1177 (6th Cir. 1974), afJ'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp.
425, 436 (D. Conn. 1979), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
77. See Luckie v. Gorsuch, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,400 (D. Ariz. 1983).
78. See ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE, supra note 73, at 9-10.
79. See supra notes 19-23.
80. See ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE, supra note 73, at 9-10.
81. Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,505.
82. IL
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tion priorities, "facilities with a good compliance history may be subject
to fewer inspections." 83
Similarly, EPA states that it will not reduce its enforcement re-
sponses or offer other incentives in exchange for auditing.84 However,
the Agency explains that, in developing a particular enforcement re-
sponse to violations, "EPA policy is to take into account, on a case-by-
case basis, the honest and genuine efforts of regulated entities to avoid
and promptly correct environmental problems."85 Reasonable efforts to
avoid noncompliance, expeditious correction of environmental problems
discovered through audits or other means, and implementation of meas-
ures that will prevent the recurrence of these problems may be consid-
ered by EPA as honest and genuine efforts to assure compliance.
8 6
Industry commentators on the Environmental Auditing Policy State-
ment have sought a more definitive statement on the use of discretion in
levying penalties where an auditing program exists.8 7 While EPA does
not provide such a statement, it has provided additional guidance on en-
forcement response in related policy statements and has agreed to use
some enforcement discretion in negotiating consent decrees with audit
88provisions.
The Agencywide Compliance and Enforcement Strategy 8 9 directs
EPA to select enforcement responses on a case-by-case basis after consid-
ering: (1) the gravity of the violation in terms of environmental impact
and effect on EPA's ability to carry out its programs; (2) the reasons why
the violation occurred; and (3) the nature of the violator, including its
compliance record and the economic benefit it gained as a result of the
violation.90 Many EPA program-specific enforcement policies further set
enforcement priorities for certain categories of violations.91 For exam-
ple, under the RCRA Enforcement Response Policy, a primary enforce-
ment priority is all Class I groundwater violations.92 Further, EPA
policy sets categories of violations for which cash penalties must be
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 46,505-06.
87. See PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 46, comments of GPU Service Corp.
88. For a discussion of environmental audit provisions in EPA consent decrees, see infra
notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
89. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AGENCYWIDE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY AND STRATEGY FRAMEWORK FOR EPA COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (1984).
90. Id. at 25.
91. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRA ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE POLICY
6-14 (1984).
92. Class I violations involve a release or threatened release of hazardous wastes to the
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paid.9
3
EPA has also developed a policy establishing criteria for federal en-
forcement where initial enforcement of an environmental statute has
been delegated to the state.94 To generally avoid federal enforcement,
states must take "timely and appropriate" enforcement action.95 The
policy requires initiation of formal legal action by a state within a certain
period of time after detection (either through issuance of an administra-
tive order or civil referral), and sets criteria for selecting appropriate
state enforcement responses.96 Program-specific policies have defined and
implemented the "timely and appropriate" concept.97
Although it does not explicitly address auditing, EPA's Policy on
Civil Penalties98 also provides some guidance for calculating penalties in
administrative and judicial enforcement actions where the violator agrees
to perform an activity, such as an audit, as part of a settlement. At a
minimum, the penalty must remove the economic benefit for failure to
comply99 and obtain an additional amount to reflect the seriousness or
gravity of the violation."° The gravity component of the penalty can be
adjusted to reflect the following factors: (1) degree of willfulness; (2) his-
tory of noncompliance; (3) ability to pay; and (4) degree of coopera-
tion.10 1 Statute-specific penalty policies also discuss these adjustment
factors. 102 Expeditious correction of past compliance problems may re-
sult in some mitigation.
0 3
Thus, a company's willingness to set up an environmental auditing
program as part of a settlement, as well as expeditious correction of new
environment, failure to assure groundwater protection, proper post-closure care, or delivery of
wastes to a permitted interim status facility. Id. at 11.
93. ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE, supra note 73, at 11-13.
94. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPLEMENTING THE STATE/FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP
IN ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS (1984).
95. Id. at 11-14.
96. Id. at 11-12.
97. For example, the RCRA Enforcement Response Policy requires administrative action
or case referral for certain class I violations within 90 days. RCRA ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
POLICY, supra note 91, at 6.
98. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (1984) [hereinafter
cited as POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES]. A companion EPA policy document issued on the
same day provides guidance on how to write penalty assessment guidelines for a particular
environmental program. See IMPLEMENTING EPA's POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra
note 36.
99. IMPLEMENTING EPA's POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 36, at 2, 6-14.
100. Id. at 2-3, 4-16.
101. Id. at 16-24.
102. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL RCRA CIVIL PENALTY POLICY 16-
21(1984).
103. IMPLEMENTING EPA'S POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 36, at 21.
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audit-discovered violations, could show cooperation, potentially allowing
partial mitigation of the penalty amount."° Such an approach serves the
Agency settlement goal of swift resolution of environmental problems."15
Of course, any adjustment may not reduce the penalty below an amount
which is greater than the stated economic benefit by some nontrivial
amount. 1
0 6
EPA consent decree guidance107 also recognizes that defendants
may agree to take certain actions, above and beyond those necessary to
meet statutory requirements, in order to offset a cash penalty, as long as
this type of agreement is explicitly noted in the decree. 108 A well devel-
oped audit system could produce additional environmental protection by
going beyond current monitoring and reporting requirements."0 9
The TSCA Settlement with Conditions Policy 10 appears to allow for
some type of mitigation if the remedy includes an audit. This policy pro-
vides that EPA may agree to remit a portion of the proposed civil penalty
where the violator agrees to take extensive and specific remedial ac-
tions. "' The remedial actions may be related not only to the violations
discovered by the Agency, but also to other current violations which
have not yet been discovered, 2 e.g., through an audit of other company
facilities where similar violations are suspected.
B. Audit Provisions as Remedies in EPA Enforcement Actions
In addition to encouraging voluntary development of auditing pro-
grams, EPA has begun to seek audit provisions as remedies in certain
administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The idea of using an
enforcement action to negotiate an environmental audit is relatively
new."
1 3
Traditional EPA settlement agreements have required correction of
specific violations and assessed penalties. Settlements typically include
104. See id. at 19. See also ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE, supra note 73, at 15.
105. IMPLEMENTING EPA'S POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 36, at 5.
106. Id. at 5-6.
107. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR DRAFTING JUDICIAL CONSENT DE-
CREES (1983).
108. Id. at 18.
109. See ENVTL. L. INST., ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING ISSUE PAPER: PROVISION IN
CONSENT DECREES, REPORT TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1985) [here-
inafter cited as PROVISION IN CONSENT DECREES].
110. TSCA Settlement with Conditions, in TSCA COMPLIANCE/ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
MANUAL app. A (1984).
111. Id. at app. A-124.
112. Id.
113. Mays, supra note 1, at 27.
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the following provisions: (1) requiring compliance with applicable stat-
utes or regulations and committing the defendant to a particular reme-
dial course of action by a set date; (2) scheduling a timetable for
achieving compliance which requires the greatest degree of remedial ac-
tion as quickly as possible, including interim dates to allow for Agency
monitoring of defendant's progress; (3) monitoring, reporting and sam-
pling provisions; (4) requiring site entry and access and document re-
view; (5) assessing civil penalties for statutory violations; and
(6) assessing stipulated penalties for violating the consent decree.1 14
These settlements may fail to address the lack of a company policy en-
couraging continuing compliance with environmental laws and regula-
tions, as well as the absence of procedures which would effectively
implement such a policy.115
EPA has broad authority to negotiate an audit provision in a con-
sent decree as part of its authority to require self-monitoring as a remedy
for violators.11 6 EPA can obtain remedies not expressly authorized by
statute or required under EPA regulations, where the decree's terms do
not violate the statute's express prohibitions. 17
While EPA consent decree guidance does not explicitly address pro-
visions for environmental audits, the guidance would support an audit as
contributing to compliance with applicable statutes and regulations. 1 '
In addition, an audit system can establish a remedial course of action
which strengthens the compliance sections of consent decrees by examin-
ing a firm's compliance efforts on a continuing basis. Under this gui-
dance, where a firm has a long history of repeated violations, EPA
negotiators should consider including more stringent compliance moni-
toring provisions, particularly provisions requiring more frequent moni-
toring and testing by the source to ensure continued future
compliance.' 19 Additionally, while EPA enforcement policy encourages
remedies which are closely related to the violations at issue, a more ex-
tensive management audit may be appropriate if the violations are a re-
sult of poor oversight by management. 120 The TSCA Settlement With
114. GUIDANCE FOR DRAFTING JUDICIAL CONSENT DECREES, supra note 107, at 10-18,
22-24.
115. See Mays, supra note 1, at 27.
116. See, e.g., CWA § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982); CAA § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1982).
See also PROVISION IN CONSENT DECREES, supra note 109, at 4.
117. PROVISION IN CONSENT DECREES, supra note 109, at 2. See United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
118. See GUIDANCE FOR DRAFTING JUDICIAL CONSENT DECREES, supra note 107, at 10.
119. Id. at 14.
120. See PROVISION IN CONSENT DECREES, supra note 109, at 7.
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Conditions Policy also implicitly supports incorporation of audit provi-
sions in consent decrees as a broader remedial action to address undis-
covered violations.
1 21
The Environmental Audit Policy Statement states that EPA may
propose auditing provisions in consent decrees and in other settlement
negotiations where: (1) a systematic pattern of violations can be attrib-
uted to the absence of, or poor functioning of, an environmental manage-
ment system; and (2) the type or nature of violations points to the
likelihood of similar violations elsewhere in the facility or other facilities
operated by the regulated entity.122 Audit provisions in consent decrees
can be an efficient and effective use of EPA's enforcement resources. Im-
provements resulting from an audit could apply throughout a multi-facil-
ity company, and raise the level of environmental compliance at all
facilities.' 23 In proposing audits in appropriate settlements, EPA also
expects to encourage other regulated entities to develop auditing
programs.
IV. EPA USE OF AUDITING IN CONSENT DECREES
EPA has recently negotiated environmental audit provisions in sev-
eral settlement agreements. Most auditing provisions are contained in
administrative settlement agreements under TSCA 124 and RCRA. 25 In
TSCA cases, EPA has generally negotiated environmental audit provi-
sions for polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) violations where EPA has sus-
pected similar violations at other company facilities which are not the
subject of the immediate enforcement action.126 Under TSCA, for facili-
ties with PCBs, the regulated entities generally have no affirmative duty
to obtain federal use permits, discharge permits or waste manifests,' 27 so
a particular facility within a company may have little contact with the
regulatory agency. Other company facilities also may not be familiar
with TSCA requirements, and may have TSCA violations. In RCRA
cases, EPA has negotiated audit provisions to address inadequate haz-
ardous waste management practices, including monitoring, reporting and
121. See TSCA Settlement with Conditions, supra note 110, at app. A-124.
122. Interim Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 46,506.
123. See Mays, supra note 1, at 27.
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
126. See, e.g., In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-101 (EPA Reg. V
June 8, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
127. In addition, unlike statutes which generally regulate individual facilities, TSCA fo-
cuses on the testing, pre-manufacturing clearance, and regulation and distribution of individ-
ual toxic substances.
June 1986] 1205
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1189
recordkeeping requirements. 128
Environmental audit provisions in consent decrees may be as broad
or as narrow as the number, scope and severity of a company's violations
seem to require. 129 EPA has generally negotiated two types of audit pro-
visions: compliance audits and management audits. Compliance audits
have been used where EPA finds that violations discovered at a facility
may be typical of violations at other company facilities,130 given the com-
pany officials' apparent lack of familiarity with regulatory requirements.
In such cases, the companies have agreed to review the compliance status
of all corporate facilities to ensure that similar violations do not exist,
and to certify to EPA that all facilities are in compliance. 131 Where a
firm does not accurately certify compliance, and EPA subsequently dis-
covers violations at the certified facilities, EPA can proceed with a crimi-
nal enforcement action based on knowing and willful falsification of
reports.
1 32
Management audits have been negotiated where EPA believed that
a pattern of violations resulted in large part from a lack of, or poor func-
tioning of, corporate environmental management or operational con-
trols. 133 In developing such controls, a company may be required to go
beyond a review of facility compliance status and examine its entire envi-
ronmental management policies, procedures, and organizational struc-
ture and programs affecting all company employees and operations. 134
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 135 and In re Crompton &
Knowles Corp. 136 involved TSCA administrative enforcement actions for
PCB violations which resulted in settlement agreements involving com-
pliance audit provisions. In Crompton, EPA alleged that the company
failed to: (1) affix the required PCB warning label transformers; (2) in-
spect, record and report leaks to EPA; and (3) develop and maintain
128. See, e.g., In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., Nos. RCRA-09-84-0037, TSCA-
09-84-0009 (EPA Reg. IX Nov. 7, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
129. Mays, Environmental Audits: Addressing Root Causes, CHEM. WEEK, May 29, 1985,
at 4. See also Mays, supra note 1, at 27.
130. See Mays, supra note 129, at 4.
131. See, eg., In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-101, at 6-7 (EPA Reg.
V June 8, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
132. See Reed, supra note 4, at 10,304.
133. Mays, supra note 1, at 27; Mays, supra note 129, at 4.
134. Mays, supra note 129, at 4.
135. Administrative Complaint, In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-101
(EPA Reg. V filed Feb. 14, 1983).
136. Administrative Complaint, In re Crompton & Knowles Corp., No. TSCA-PCB-82-
0108 (EPA Reg. II filed July 29, 1982).
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records on the disposition of PCB and PCB items at the facility. 13 7
The consent agreement and final order in Crompton assessed a civil
penalty and required the company to take the following actions in a com-
pliance audit: (1) certify to EPA that it had conducted an inventory of
PCBs, PCB items, heat transfer systems and hydraulic systems at each of
its twenty-eight facilities; (2) submit a written report for each facility
specifying the location and quantity of PCBs, PCB items, heat transfer
systems and hydraulic systems at each of its twenty-eight facilities;
(3) describe the audit at each facility; and (4) within sixty days of the
effective date of the consent decree, certify by a responsible corporate
official that each facility is in compliance with PCB regulations, includ-
ing the basis upon which it would certify compliance.
131
Owens-Corning involved a similar PCB compliance audit for sixty-
three facilities 139 while the audit in In re Potlatch Corp. covered forty-
eight company facilities. 1" The compliance audits in EPA v. Chem-Se-
curity Systems, Inc. 141 were limited to the facility at issue in the adminis-
trative enforcement actions, and required Chem-Security to conduct four
quarterly TSCA (PCB) and RCRA compliance audits, and to send the
audit reports to EPA.142
In In re Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,43 EPA alleged that the
company failed to notify EPA of its intention to manufacture a chemical
substance not on the TSCA inventory and used for commercial purposes
an illegally manufactured substance. 144 The consent agreement and order
required the company to perform a TSCA compliance audit of all of its
forty-three facilities, to evaluate the TSCA compliance status facilities,
and to report TSCA violations discovered at those facilities.145 In addi-
tion to reviewing PCB compliance, the audit required Diamond Sham-
rock to assess compliance with several other TSCA recordkeeping and
137. In re Crompton & Knowles, No. TSCA-PCB-82-0108, at 3-4 (EPA Reg. II Sept. 17,
1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
138. Id. at app. B.
139. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-101, app. at 6-7 (EPA Reg. V
June 8, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
140. In re Potlatch Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-137, at 4 (EPA Reg. V Aug. 3, 1983) (Consent
Agreement and Final Order).
141. EPA v. Chem-Security Sys., Inc., No. 1085-07-42-2615P (EPA Reg. X Dec. 26, 1985)
(Consent Agreement and Final Order).
142. Id. at 3-6.
143. Administrative Complaint, In re Diamond Shamrock-Chem. Co., No. TSCA-85-H-03
(EPA Headquarters filed Mar. 18, 1985).
144. Id. at 1-7.
145. In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., No. TSCA-85-H-03, Audit Agreement (EPA
Headquarters June 28, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
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reporting requirements and to report all discovered TSCA violations to
EPA.1
46
In In re Union Carbide Corp., *7 EPA alleged that Union Carbide
manufactured and used for a commercial purpose a chemical substance
without the required premanufacturing notice, and thus was not on the
TSCA inventory in violation of sections 5 and 15 of TSCA. "8 As part of
the settlement agreement, Union Carbide agreed to prepare over the fol-
lowing year: (1) an educational program designed to reemphasize
premanufacturing notice compliance, which will be presented to a broad
company audience; and (2) subsequent to the completion of such educa-
tional program, implement a program of not less than five test inputs to
monitor responses for TSCA compliance.'49 Such a program will allow
the corporation to assess the compliance capability under actual business
conditions by responding to artificially created violations.
EPA has negotiated management environmental audits in several
other administrative settlements with Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
(CWM). In In re Chemical Waste Management'5 ° (Kettleman Hills fa-
cility), EPA alleged that CWM committed numerous RCRA violations
including failure to implement an adequate groundwater monitoring sys-
tem, failure to implement an unsaturated zone monitoring program, fail-
ure to develop an adequate closure plan, failure to make substantial
modifications to the facility,' as well as violations of section 15 of
TSCA. 52 CWM agreed to perform a compliance and management au-
dit covering all RCRA and TSCA requirements at the facility. The con-
146. Id. at 2-5.
147. Administrative Complaint, In re Union Carbide Corp., No. TSCA-85-H-06 (EPA
Headquarters filed June 17, 1985).
148. Id. at 2.
149. In re Union Carbide Corp., No. TSCA-85-H-06, at 6-7 (EPA Headquarters Feb. 26,
1986) (Consent Agreement and Order). Similar TSCA violations formed the basis for an audit
in In re BASF Wyandotte Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-410 (EPA Reg. V filed Apr. 25, 1986) (Con-
sent Agreement and Final Order). The audit required BASF to review 13 facilities and certify
that all chemicals required to be listed on the TSCA Chemical Substances Inventory were so
listed. Id. at 2-3.
150. See, In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. RCRA-09-84-0037 (EPA Reg. IX
July 3, 1984) (Determination of Violation, Compliance Order and Notice of Right to Request
Hearing); In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. RCRA-09-84-0037 (EPA Reg. IX
June 6, 1985) (Amended Determination of Violation, Compliance Order and Notice of Right
to Request a Hearing).
151. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. RCRA-09-84-0037, at 5-26 (EPA Reg.
IX June 6, 1985) (Amended Determination of Violation, Compliance Order and Notice of
Right to Request a Hearing).
152. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. TSCA-09-84-0009 (EPA Reg. IX filed
June 6, 1985) (Administrative Complaint and Notice of Hearing).
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sent agreement and final order'53 included an audit which provided for
an independent third party auditor to submit a proposal for the scope of
work to EPA to audit waste operations and environmental management
systems at the facility and in CWM's corporate environmental manage-
ment department.1 5 4 Within one year after obtaining a written agree-
ment on the scope of work for the audit, the auditor was required to
submit written reports to EPA on RCRA and TSCA compliance. These
reports would:
(1) identify and describe the facility's existing waste manage-
ment operations, including management systems, policies and
prevailing practices;
(2) evaluate such operations, systems, practices and policies,
identifying strengths and weaknesses; and
(3) identify and describe areas of waste management opera-
tions and environmental management systems that could be
significantly improved, including personnel training, corporate
management and lines of authority, operations and mainte-
nance procedures, interim stabilization, and quality control and
assurance. 1
55
Within ninety days after CWM's receipt of these reports, CWM was re-
quired to submit to EPA the portion of the report containing findings
and recommendations of the auditor, CWM's evaluation of each option,
and specific actions the company would take, as well as a schedule for
implementation.'5 6 The administrative consent agreements in In re
Chemical Waste Management'57 (Emelle facility) and in In re Chemical
Waste Management"8 (Vickery facility) involved similar management
audit requirements to address RCRA and TSCA violations.
In proposing environmental audit provisions in consent decrees,
EPA has addressed concerns on EPA access to audit-generated informa-
tion and the appropriate EPA response to violations discovered by an
audit. Of course, where an audit is conducted pursuant to a settlement
agreement, EPA has required greater access to audit data than under a
voluntary audit program to ensure compliance with the settlement. EPA
153. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., Nos. RCRA-09-84-0037, TSCA-09-84-0009
(EPA Reg. IX Nov. 7, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order) (Kettleman Hills facility).
154. Id. at 4-5.
155. Id. at 5-7.
156. Id.
157. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. TSCA-84-H-03, at 16-20 (EPA Reg. IV
Dec. 19, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
158. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., Nos. TSCA-V-C-307, RCRA-V-85R-019, at
5-9 (EPA Reg. V Apr. 5, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
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has generally reserved its right to inspect defendant's facilities to deter-
mine the accuracy of compliance verifications and other submittals. 1 9
In addition, audits may identify and document violations that may other-
wise have gone unnoticed by a regulatory agency.1 60  In some settle-
ments, reporting of audit-discovered violations has been limited to that
necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the settlement or as
otherwise authorized by regulation or statute.161 Some audits have re-
quired reporting of all audit-generated violations to EPA.162
An audit report may also include information on matters other than
the immediate environmental issues, such as the production process, that
the company would wish to keep confidential.163 In some cases, defend-
ants have been permitted to assert a business confidentiality claim with
respect to information submitted in compliance with the settlement. 164
Another settlement specifies that audit-reported information would be
treated as confidential by EPA to the extent authorized by the TSCA and
RCRA.165
EPA has assessed penalties in all audit-related settlements for past
violations, or those violations which were the subject of the original en-
forcement action.1 66 To encourage environmental auditing in settlement
agreements, EPA has been willing to limit somewhat its use of audit re-
ports in prospective enforcement actions. In some settlements, EPA has
reserved all enforcement rights regarding prospective violations. 167
Recognizing the significant benefits of continous compliance at au-
dited facilities, EPA has agreed in certain settlements that the results of
an audit would not be used by EPA as direct evidence of violations; how-
159. See, e.g., In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-101, at 7 (EPA Reg. V
June 8, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
160. See Reed, supra note 4, at 10,304.
161. See, e.g., EPA v. Chem-Security Sys., Inc., No. 1085-07-42-2615P (EPA Reg. X Dec.
26, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No.
TSCA-V-C-101 (EPA Reg. V June 8, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
162. See, e.g., In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Corp., No. TSCA-85-H-03, Audit Agree-
ment, at 2-3 (EPA Headquarters June 28, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
163. See Reed, supra note 4, at 10,304.
164. See, e.g., In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-101, at 7 (EPA Reg. V
June 8, 1984) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
165. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., Nos. RCRA-09-84-0037, TSCA-09-84-0009,
at 7 (EPA Reg. IX Nov. 7, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order) (Kettleman Hills
Facility).
166. See, eg., In re Chem-Security Sys., Inc., No. 1085-07-42-2615P, at 4 (EPA Reg. X
Dec. 26, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
167. See, e.g., In re BASF Wyandotte Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-410, at 2,4 (EPA Reg. V filed
Apr. 25, 1986) (Consent Agreement and Final Order); In re Chem-Security Sys., Inc., No.
1085-07-42-2615P, at 5-6 (EPA Reg. X Dec. 26, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
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ever, EPA is not precluded from enforcing against violations discovered
independently of the audit.16 In In re Chemical Waste Management
(Kettleman Hills facility) EPA allowed a six month grace period after
completion of the audit to correct audit-discovered violations with no
stipulated penalties, while EPA allowed a six month grace period after
the settlement date to discover and remedy violations in In re Diamond
Shamrock Chemicals Co. After this time period, EPA could enforce
against such violations.1 69 However, grace periods will probably only be
considered where the government will achieve significant compliance
benefits from the settlement. Also, a grace period does not preclude EPA
from bringing enforcement action to enforce the consent agreement or to
seek injunctive relief to abate a condition which may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment, or an imminent hazard under
TSCA
1 70
EPA should be willing to adjust its enforcement response where a
company provides more compliance information on its facilities than the
Agency would have obtained through its compliance monitoring pro-
grams, and where subsequent violations are quickly corrected. This
could apply, in particular, where audit-discovered violations involve little
or no economic benefit or savings to the violator under agency penalty
policy, such as various TSCA reporting and recordkeeping violations.
However, where a new violation does involve economic savings, EPA
will probably, at a minimum, assess a penalty which reflects such savings,
although it may provide some adjustment for the gravity aspect of the
violation. To do otherwise would not be fair to the numerous companies
within the same industrial category who have paid for the costs of pollu-
tion control and would place complying facilities at a competitive
disadvantage.
V. CONCLUSION
Environmental auditing will play a growing role in the Nation's ef-
forts to achieve continuous compliance with the environmental laws.
EPA has encouraged the use of environmental auditing by regulated enti-
ties through its auditing policy and through use of audit provisions in
appropriate settlement agreements. Audit programs serve regulated enti-
168. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., Nos. RCRA-09-84-0037, TSCA-09-84-0009,
at 7 (EPA Reg. IX Nov. 7, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
169. Id. See also In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Corp., No. TSCA-85-H-03, Audit
Agreement, at 8 (EPA Headquarters June 28, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
170. In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., No. TSCA-85-H-03, Audit Agreement, at 8
(EPA Headquarters June 28, 1985) (Consent Agreement and Final Order).
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ties' interest in long-term cost savings and improved cooperation with
regulatory agencies, while they complement the compliance efforts of
regulatory agencies.
In implementing and refining Agency policy on auditing, EPA needs
to be aware of the legitimate interest of regulated entities in disclosure of
certain audit generated information and in taking enforcement responses
which recognize defendants' genuine compliance efforts. EPA should
also continue to obtain environmental audit provisions in consent de-
crees, particularly where a pattern of multi-facility compliance and envi-
ronmental management problems exists. Moreover, by maintaining a
strong enforcement program and penalty deterrent, EPA will encourage
new voluntary environmental audit programs.
